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Abstract
The paper analyzes the profitability of RDcooperation under asymmetric spillovers. It is
shown that a firm prefers RDcompetition to RJV cartelization when its own spillover rate is
low and the spillover rate of its competitor is high. While it prefers RDcartelization to RJV
cartelization when the spillover rate of its competitor is sufficiently high. The equilibrium
configuration is RJV cartelization for low spillover asymmetries, RDcompetition for
intermediate asymmetries, and RDcartelization for high asymmetries.
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1. Introduction
The large literature on precompetitive R&D has mostly assumed that firms are symmetric.
Yet, in the real world no two firms are alike: firms differ in size, technology, etc. Such asymmetries
will affect how firms participate in technological cooperation, what they gain from it, and what
threats it poses to them. One particular type of asymmetry between firms is asymmetry in R&D
spillover levels. Differences in spillovers can be due to many factors: absorptive capacities (Cohen
and Levinthal, 1989), the type of research conducted, inter-industry differences, differences in
investments in secrecy, etc. Jarmin (1993:1) notes: “Geographical location, research and
development expenditures and other idiosyncratic firm characteristics are likely to affect how
individual firms learn from the experience of their rivals.” 
This paper analyzes R&D cooperation when firms have different levels of spillovers. The
paper focuses on RJV cartelization, where firms coordinate R&D expenditures and share their
research results. The profitability of RJV cartelization is analyzed, relative to both R&D competition
and R&D cartelization (where firms only coordinate their R&D expenditures).
A few studies deal with different facets of asymmetries between firms. Atallah (2005a)
analyzes R&D cartelization with asymmetric spillovers, and finds that R&D cooperation is
profitable to both firms for a relatively limited range of spillovers: when spillovers are highly
symmetric or highly asymmetric. He also shows that R&D cartelization increases total R&D
investments iff the average spillover rate in the industry is sufficiently high. Amir and Wooders
(2000) analyze unidirectional spillovers. De Bondt and Henriques (1995) and Amir and Wooders
(1999) show that endogenous leader-follower roles arise due to asymmetric spillovers. Jarmin (1993)
studies learning by doing and allows for differences in spillovers between firms. Kesteloot and
Veugelers (1997) and Petit and Tolwinski (1999) allow for asymmetries in firm size and spillovers,
but do not consider information sharing.
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The current note derives three main results. First, a firm prefers R&D competition to RJV
cartelization if its (outgoing) spillover rate is sufficiently low and the spillover rate of its competitor
is sufficiently high. Second, a firm prefers RJV cartelization to R&D cartelization when the spillover
of its competitor is sufficiently low. Finally, the equilibrium configuration structure is (RJV
cartelization, R&D competition, R&D cartelization) for (low, intermediate, high) spillover
asymmetries.
2. The profitability of RJV cartelization
Two firms producing a homogeneous good compete à la Cournot. Demand is given by p=A-
y1-y2, where yi denotes the output of firm i. The marginal cost of firm i is given by
(1)
where " is the initial marginal cost, xi is the R&D output of firm i, and $j,[0,1] is the outgoing
spillover rate from firm j to firm i. Profits are given by
(2)
cx x ii j j =− − αβ
πγ ii i i pcy x =− − ()
22All proofs are in the Appendix.
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where (x
2 represents the convex costs of R&D.
The game has two stages: in the first stage firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and in the
second stage they compete in output. Solving backward, the solution to the output stage is
 
(3)
For the R&D stage, two scenarios are considered: R&D competition, where each firm
chooses its R&D to maximize its own profits; and RJV cartelization, where firms choose their R&D
investments to maximize joint profits, in addition to exchanging all information, that is, setting








Substituting the solutions for R&D and output into (2) yields the equilibrium profits. Non-
cooperation profits are given by
(8)
Cooperation profits are given by
(9)
The goal of this note is to compare cooperation with competition profits. 
Proposition 1.
2 Firm i prefers R&D competition to RJV cartelization when $i is low and $j is high,
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]3We know that RJV cartelization is always socially beneficial (unless there is overinvestment in R&D, which is not
the case here) because it increases R&D investments and diffusion.
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Figure 1 shows how RJV cartelization affects profits. Consider for instance firm 1. Firm 1
gains from cooperation, except when $1 is low and $2 is high. In these circumstances, firm 1 prefers
not to cooperate with firm 2. RJV cartelization involves both the coordination of R&D investments
and perfect information sharing. When $1 is low, cooperation implies a significant increase in $1,
which benefits firm 2 substantially. And when $2 is high, the increase in $2 (given by 1-$2) is
negligible, hence the gain to firm 1 is minor compared to the gain to firm 2, resulting in an
improvement in the competitive position of firm 2. 
As for R&D expenditures, we know that R&D investments of both firms increase with the
passage from R&D competition to RJV cartelization, and so does the effective cost reduction of each
firm, which represents the dollar amount of cost reduction per unit of output. However, the increase
in x1 benefits firm 2 disproportionally, because of the significant increase in $1. And the increase in
x2, although substantial (because firm 2 was initially investing less in R&D, due to its high
spillover), does not benefit firm 1 as much, because the increase in $2 is lower than the increase in
$1. By the same token, firm 2 prefers not to cooperate when $2 is low and $1 is high.
Figure 1 illustrates the spillover region where both firms prefer RJV cartelization to R&D
competition. Outside this shaded region, RJV cartelization will not occur, because it is not profitable
to one of the firms. Hence, the white areas of figure 1 represent regions where R&D cooperation is
socially beneficial,
3 but does not take place because it is privately unprofitable.4The detailed analysis of R&D cartelization with asymmetric spillovers, as well as the comparison of its profitability
with R&D competition, has been performed in Atallah (2005a), and hence is not taken up here.
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3. RJV cartelization vs. R&D cartelization
This model also allows us to analyze the profitability of RJV cartelization versus R&D
cartelization.
4 Under R&D cartelization, firms coordinate their R&D expenditures, but don’t share
any information, hence the spillover rate is not affected by cooperation. Letting the first stage take
place under R&D cartelization instead of RJV cartelization, yields the following investment in
R&D:
(10)
Here we are interested in the difference B
Rcar-B
c. 
Proposition 2. Firm i prefers R&D cartelization to RJV cartelization when $j is high, with the
critical value of $j increasing in $i.
Figure 2 illustrates the comparison between B1
Rcar and B1
c. We can see that firm 1 prefers
RJV cartelization to R&D cartelization when $2 is sufficiently low, and a lower $2 is required the
lower is $1. The intuition is the same as for the comparison between R&D competition and RJV
cartelization. The only difference between the two cooperative scenarios is that RJV cartelization
involves information sharing, while R&D cartelization does not. Hence, when $1 is high and $2 is
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getting a substantial benefit from the diffusion of firm 2's technology; hence firm 1 prefers the shift
to RJV cartelization, so that information sharing is equalized. Moreover, because R&D cartelization
involves joint profit maximization, the region where R&D cartelization is preferred to RJV
cartelization is larger than the region where R&D competition is preferred to RJV cartelization. By
symmetry, firm 2 prefers RJV cartelization to R&D cartelization when $1 is sufficiently low.
We can see from figure 2 that both firms prefer RJV cartelization in an area around the
positively sloped diagonal, the width of which shrinks as spillovers increase. Outside this region,
one of the firms would prefer R&D cartelization. Given that RJV cartelization is a “fuller” form of
cooperation -because it involves an additional component, information sharing-, the agreement of
both firms is likely to be required to shift from R&D cartelization to RJV cartelization. This
agreement is unlikely to be obtained outside the shaded region in figure 2 (again, even though it is
socially beneficial).
It is useful to contrast the effect of spillover asymmetries on the profitability of R&D
cartelization (studied in Atallah, 2005a) vs. RJV cartelization (studied here), since these are the two
main types of R&D cooperation studied in the literature. Figure 3 illustrates the regions where R&D
cartelization is profitable to both firms under R&D cartelization (relative to R&D competition). 
        Source: Atallah (2005a)
Under R&D cartelization, cooperation is mutually beneficial when spillovers are either close
to being symmetric or are very asymmetric. In contrast, with RJV cartelization (figure 1),
cooperation is mutually beneficial in a spillover region around the positively sloped diagonal, that
is, when spillovers are not “too asymmetric”. Hence RJV cartelization is compatible with low or5The following is an alternative set of rules which leads exactly to the same outcomes:
-If R&D competition is the first choice of at least one firm, R&D competition is the equilibrium.
-If the first choices of both firms coincide, this choice is the equilibrium.
-Any choice that is ranked below R&D competition for any firm is eliminated, and the previous two rules are applied to the
remaining choices.
-If one firm prefers R&D cartelization to RJV cartelization, while the other firm prefers RJV cartelization to R&D
cartelization, and R&D competition is in third place for both firms, then the equilibrium is R&D cartelization.
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intermediate levels of asymmetries, while R&D cartelization is compatible with low or high degrees
of asymmetries. Moreover, the region where RJV cartelization is mutually beneficial is much larger
than the region where R&D cartelization is mutually beneficial. By allowing for information sharing
and increasing diffusion and R&D, RJV cartelization creates a win-win situation and is sustainable
for a wider range of spillovers. Whereas, by simply focusing on eliminating duplication, not
encouraging diffusion, and sometimes reducing R&D (when the average spillover rate is sufficiently
low), R&D cartelization is much more conflictual, and more sensitive to spillover asymmetries.
4. Equilibrium configuration
Putting these pieces of information together, we can predict what will be the equilibrium
configuration for all spillover levels. The types of R&D interactions studied in this note differ by
their ease of implementation. While the literature does not offer a precise definition of the ease of
implementation, it is reasonable to expect that the more dimensions are involved in a type of
cooperation, the harder it will be to implement, and more explicit agreement will be required of all
participants. The easiest configuration to implement is R&D competition, since it requires no
communication and no agreement. R&D cartelization is more complex than R&D competition, since
it requires the coordination of R&D expenditures; but simpler than RJV cartelization, since the latter
involves also information sharing. Henceforth, the agreement of both firms is required to switch
from R&D competition to either R&D cartelization or RJV cartelization. Moreover, the agreement
of both firms is required to switch from R&D cartelization to RJV cartelization.
The equilibrium concept used is noncooperative bargaining. This stage would precede the
R&D and output stages. Figure 4 illustrates the bargaining structure. Firms have to choose the same
type of cooperation in equilibrium, asymmetric outcomes do not make sense here. Firms start, by
default, at R&D competition (this is the no agreement outcome). Firms determine whether they want
to go from R&D competition to R&D cartelization. The agreement of both firms is required for this
move, and each firm will agree to it iff it increases its profits. If yes, firms then determine whether
they want to go from R&D cartelization to RJV cartelization or not; if both agree, the equilibrium
is RJV cartelization, otherwise it is R&D cartelization. If the move from R&D competition to R&D
cartelization is rejected by at least one of the firms, firms consider the option of moving from R&D
competition to RJV cartelization. If both agree, RJV cartelization is the equilibrium, otherwise R&D
competition is the equilibrium. This bargaining structure ensures that any move taken is mutually
profitable to both firms.
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Figure 5 illustrates the equilibrium configurations in the spillovers’ space. In the white
regions, at least one of the firms prefers R&D competition to either R&D cartelization or RJV
cartelization. Given that the other firm cannot “force” it to cooperate as R&D competition is the no
agreement configuration, the equilibrium in these regions is R&D competition. In the black regions,
both firms prefer R&D cartelization to R&D competition, and at least one of the firms prefers R&D
cartelization to RJV cartelization. Hence firms agree to cooperate, but one firm is not interested in
information sharing, and cannot be forced into it by the other firm; therefore, the equilibrium is
R&D cartelization. In the grey regions, both firms prefer RJV cartelization to R&D competition and
R&D cartelization, hence RJV cartelization is the equilibrium. 
It can be seen from that figure that RJV cartelization is the equilibrium for relatively
symmetric spillovers, R&D cartelization is the equilibrium for very asymmetric spillovers or when
both spillovers are asymmetric but close to 1, while R&D competition is the equilibrium when the
level of asymmetry is intermediate. There is a non-monotonic relationship between the complexity
of R&D agreements and spillover asymmetries.
Proposition 3.  When firms choose between R&D competition, R&D cartelization, and RJV
cartelization, the equilibrium is:
-RJV cartelization when the degree of asymmetry in spillovers is low;
-R&D competition when the degree of asymmetry in spillovers is intermediate;
-R&D cartelization when the degree of asymmetry in spillovers is high (and also when spillovers8
are asymmetric but close to 1).
5. Conclusions
It was shown that a firm prefers R&D competition to RJV cartelization if its spillover rate
is sufficiently low and the spillover rate of its competitor is sufficiently high. As for the comparison
between RJV cartelization and R&D cartelization, a firm prefers RJV cartelization when the
spillover of its competitor is sufficiently low. The equilibrium is (RJV cartelization, R&D
competition, R&D cartelization) for (low, intermediate, high) spillover asymmetries.
Under symmetric spillovers, RJV cartelization is always preferred by all firms to both R&D
competition and R&D cartelization. Neither of these results holds when spillovers are asymmetric.
Moreover, there is a significant range of spillovers where firms don’t agree on R&D coordination
and/or information sharing. Ongoing research by the author aims at developing more sophisticated
information sharing schemes, which take into account initial asymmetries in spillovers, and which
would make R&D cooperation incentive compatible for a wider range of spillovers.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. 
When comparing profits between any two settings, the s.o.c. must be satisfied for both settings.
Moreover, from (6), the nonnegativity of xi
c requires 9
(11)





(12), (13), and (14) require (>4/9, which is true by (11).
(15)
(15) requires (>2/3. But this is true since
(16)
iff (>2/3.
Similar conditions hold for firm 2, with the roles of $1 and $2 reversed. Equations (12) through (15),
along with the continuity of the profit functions, imply Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.
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which requires (>0.59. But this is true since
(23)
requires (>0.59.
Similar conditions hold for firm 2, with the roles of $1 and $2 reversed. Equations (18), (19), (20),
and (22) along with the continuity of the profit functions, imply Proposition 2.
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